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I propose that pre-IPO venture-backed biotech companies offer a useful new setting through 
which to evaluate the relative merits of theories for why firm size and book-to-market explain 
variation in stock returns.  This is because pre-IPO biotech firms have large and rapidly evolving 
growth options relative to assets-in-place.  Such attributes align closely with the key features of 
Berk et al.’s (1999) model of the endogenous relations between growth options, optimal 
investment actions and expected equity returns, where firm size and book-to-market emerge as 
sufficient statistics for the aggregate risk of a firm’s assets-in-place.  Using venture capital 
investments in pre-IPO U.S. biotech companies during 1992-2001, I find that equity returns 
between financing rounds (‘round-to-round’ returns) are reliably negatively related to firm size 
and positively related to book-to-market ratios.  I interpret these results as being most consistent 
with Berk et al.’s theory, and less consistent with alternative explanations such as financial 
distress, behaviorally biased investors or data snooping. 
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1. Executive summary 
 
Venture investors supply equity capital to start-up technology firms to finance the conversion 
of those firms’ new ideas into tangible products and services.  This paper evaluates whether the 
returns earned by venture investors reflect the pricing of similar types of risks as in publicly 
traded stocks, and why.  In particular, I focus on the pricing of firm size and book-to-market. 
 
Pre-IPO venture-backed firms offer a powerful setting for doing this because they have few 
hard assets but large amounts of growth options.  These characteristics underpin new approaches 
to analyzing risk and return based on Berk et al. (1999).  Berk et al. theorize that firm size and 
book-to-market are priced in equity returns because they reflect firms’ optimal exercising of their 
growth options, and the changing relative importance of hard assets and growth options. 
 
Venture-backed firms and venture investors also tend not to have the characteristics called for 
by competing explanations for why firm size and book-to-market are priced in equity returns.  
For example, venture capital data is largely free of ‘research snooping’ biases.  Although venture 
investors on average earn high returns, the typical book-to-market ratio of a venture-backed firm 
is very low, not high.  And because the general partners in venture capital funds are sophisticated 
businesspeople, explanations that rely on naïve investors would seem less likely to apply. 
 
I assess the pricing of firm size and book-to-market in venture returns using U.S. biotech 
firms during 1992-2001.  Biotech firms are numerous and have large technology-oriented growth 
opportunities.  Book-to-market ratios can be computed because when firms file to go public they 
report up to five years of prior financial statements.  I combine this financial statement data with 
non-financial statement data (e.g., on patents filings and strategic alliances) and the firm-specific 
returns that venture investors earn between financing rounds. 
 
Using regression analysis, I find that venture capitalists’ ‘round-to-round’ returns are reliably 
larger the smaller is the size of the firm they invest in and the larger is its book-to-market ratio.  
Overall, my results suggest that venture capitalists are rewarded for some of the same key 
economic risks as public market investors when supplying capital to pre-IPO technology 
companies, and for reasons that most likely reflect firms’ dynamically optimal investment 
decisions concerning both their hard assets and their growth options.
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2.   Introduction 
 
There is wide agreement that firm size and book-to-market help explain the expected returns 
to publicly traded stocks.  There is far less agreement on why.  In this paper, I present a new 
setting in which alternative theories for the firm size and book-to-market phenomena can be 
tested.  The setting is the ‘round-to-round’ returns earned by venture capital investments in pre-
IPO U.S. biotech companies.  It is an appealing and informative setting for two reasons. 
 
First, pre-IPO biotech firms have very large and rapidly evolving growth options relative to 
assets-in-place.  These characteristics align closely with the key features of Berk et al.’s (1999) 
recent theory of the endogenous relations between firms’ growth options, optimal investment 
actions and expected equity returns.  In Berk et al.’s model, firm size and book-to-market emerge 
as sufficient statistics for the aggregate risk of firms’ assets-in-place.  Firm size is negatively 
related to expected returns because it is a proxy for the state variable that describes the 
importance of assets-in-place relative to growth options.  Book-to-market is positively related to 
expected returns because is a proxy for the state variable that summarizes firm risk relative to the 
scale of firm assets-in-place.  I find these predicted relations are indeed present in my sample. 
 
Second, venture-backed firms and venture investors also tend not to have the characteristics 
called for by competing explanations for why firm size and book-to-market are priced in equity 
returns.  For example, Fama and French (1993) propose that small firms and high book-to-market 
firms earn high returns because firm size and book-to-market are proxies for financial distress 
risk.  Their hypothesis predicts that pre-IPO biotech firms that are small and/or have high book-
to-market ratios will earn high returns.  However, although pre-IPO biotech firms are indeed 
small and on average earn high returns between successive financing rounds (henceforth, ‘round-
to-round’ returns) they also have very low, not high, book-to-market ratios. 
 
Pre-IPO biotech firms are also primarily financed by venture capital funds whose general 
partners are sophisticated and experienced businesspeople.  As a result, Lakonishok et al.’s 
(1994) hypothesis that high book-to-market stocks earn high returns because investors are 
naïve—they incorrectly extrapolate past poor earnings growth—predicts that there will be no 
relation between returns and book-to-market ratios for pre-IPO venture-backed biotech firms.   
 
Lastly, Lo and MacKinlay (1990) and Black (1993) suggest that repeated analysis on the 
same publicly traded stock return data means that anomalous findings such as the pricing of firm 
size and book-to-market merely reflect in-sample data mining and/or misplaced reliance on 
classical statistics.  However, the prior literature on the relations between firm size, book-to-
market and returns in the pre-IPO market consists of one study of one fund’s private equity 
portfolio (Gompers and Lerner, 1998).  Thus the data snooping explanation for why firm size and 
book-to-market help explain variation in expected returns does not predict there will be a relation 
between firm size, book-to-market and expected returns for pre-IPO biotech firms. 
 
Although the setting of venture capital investments in pre-IPO biotech firms offers a novel 
opportunity for testing firm size and book-to-market theories, it comes with a potentially 
significant threat to inferential validity.  The threat arises because the financial statement data 
needed to construct firms’ book-to-market ratios are only available for the subset of all venture-
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backed biotech firms that have on average experienced the largest round-to-round returns, 
namely those that filed to go public.  (Private firms are not required to publicly disclose financial 
statement data unless and until they file for an IPO, at which time they must report summary 
balance sheet and income statement information for the past five years).  This selection bias 
raises the concern that the associations between returns, firm size and book-to-market observed 
in my pre-IPO dataset are spurious and not a true reflection of the economic forces modeled by 
Berk et al.  I investigate in some detail the relevance of selection bias using both Heckman and 
non-Heckman approaches and conclude that selection bias is likely not a major inferential threat. 
 
Overall, I conclude that cross-sectional variation in the round-to-round returns earned by 
venture capital investments in pre-IPO biotech companies is probably best explained by Berk et 
al.’s reasoning for the relations between firm size, book-to-market and expected returns.  The 
predictions made by competing explanations such as financial distress, investor irrationality and 
data snooping receive weaker empirical support. 
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 3 briefly describes the venture capital 
market and the economic distinctives of venture-backed biotech firms.  Section 4 summarizes the 
existing literature on the risks and returns to venture capital, and develops the predictions that 
competing theories of the pricing of firm size and book-to-market make for pre-IPO biotech 
companies.  Section 5 develops a model of the determinants of round-to-round returns.  Section 6 
details the variables used in the empirical analysis.  Section 7 provides descriptive statistics.  
Section 8 reports the results of estimating the model of returns and a variety of supplementary 
tests aimed at assessing the impacts of selection bias.  Section 9 summarizes and concludes. 
 
3. The economic distinctives of venture-backed biotechnology companies 
 
3.1. Venture capital and the economic distinctives of venture-backed firms 
 
Venture capital is the subpart of organized private equity that invests in young, typically high 
technology firms. The typical investment made by a venture fund in a company is in the form of 
illiquid preferred stock that only converts into liquid common stock or cash at one of two major 
exit points—an IPO, or the sale of the company to another entity. 
 
Venture-backed firms are predominantly technology- or innovation-driven companies that are 
in the most formative years of their life.  They derive far less of their equity value from assets-in-
place than do more mature, publicly traded firms.  Instead, the lion’s share of their equity value 
stems from the intangible-intensive growth options that dominate their investment opportunity 
sets.  Because the dominant role of intangibles in technology- and innovation-driven young 
companies creates large agency costs and information asymmetries between them and potential 
suppliers of capital (Gompers and Lerner, 2000a), a key contribution that venture capitalists 
make is in designing and implementing solutions to these agency problems, such as staging their 
financing and encouraging firms to use substantial amounts of equity-based compensation.  
Venture-backed firms are also very dynamic in the sense that they grow more rapidly and 
flexibly than do their public market counterparts (Hellman, 2000).  They tend to uncover new 
investment opportunities faster, develop them quicker and more professionally, and are more 
ready to discard and abandon bad projects than more seasoned companies (Hellman and Puri, 
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2000; 2002).  In all, venture-backed firms have rapidly evolving investment opportunity sets that 
are dominated by very risky—but potentially also very profitable—growth options. 
 
3.2. Biotechnology and biotechnology firms 
 
Biotechnology is the application of technology to the life sciences wherein living cells or 
their processes are used to solve problems and to perform specific industrial or manufacturing 
processes.  The typical biotech value chain is long and uncertain, stretching some 10–15 years 
from founding through patenting to successful FDA approval and product sales. 
 
Biotech firms were chosen for this study because they are predominantly financed in well-
defined stages or rounds by venture capital and have large fractions of their equity value in 
growth options.  Biotech firms are highly dependent on the intellectual property (ideas, 
discoveries, patents) that they generate through their large R&D expenditures, and as such are 
among the most intangible-intensive of businesses. The prototypical young biotech firm is in an 
intense R&D race against competitors to discover and patent a new drug.  It therefore has large 
capital needs over a sustained period of time.  In the early stages of life, the firm’s capital needs 
are met by venture capital and strategic equity investments from pharmaceutical companies.  
However, capital needs eventually become so large that they can only be satisfied via an IPO or a 
buyout by a large pharmaceutical company.  As a result, successful biotech firms tend to go 
public fairly quickly, so it is sometimes the case that a biotech firm’s S-1 filing with the S.E.C. to 
contain financial statements that span its entire life. Having financial statement data through IPO 
filing documents is vital for assessing the empirical relations between the returns to venture 
capital investments and firm book-to-market ratios, because private companies rarely disclose 
firm book or asset values publicly outside of IPO filings, particularly when they are young. 
 
4. The risks and returns of venture capital investments 
 
4.1. Prior literature on the relations between risk and return in venture capital 
 
Several papers have used fund-level data to examine the determinants of venture capital 
returns.  Gompers and Lerner (1998) is the only study to examine the relations among firm size, 
book-to-market and returns in the pre-IPO market.  They assess the relations between the 
quarterly excess returns on Warburg Pincus’ marked-to-market private equity portfolio between 
1972 and 1995 and the Fama-French factors.  They report a beta of 1.27 and a significant loading 
on the SMB factor.1  Using Venture Economics data from 1980 to 2001, Kaplan and Schoar 
(2005, table VIII) calculate that venture fund IRRs have a beta of 1.07 with regard to the S&P 
500, are increasing at a decreasing rate in the size of the fund, and are higher the larger was the 
prior fund raised by the venture capital group.  Using an approach that compensates for the fact 
that fund quarterly returns contain current and stale company valuations, Woodward (2004) finds 
that the beta of venture capital between 1990 and 2003 is 2.0.  Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003, 
table 10) analyze the IRRs over and above the return on the S&P 500 of 73 private equity funds 
                                                 
1 The SMB factor is the monthly difference between the return on small firms and the return on large firms.  The 
HML factor is the monthly difference between the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market firms and the return 
on a portfolio of low book-to-market firms (Fama and French, 1993). 
 
 4
that one of the largest institutional investors in private equity in the U.S. participated in between 
1981 and 1993.  They report that IRRs are increasing at a decreasing rate in fund size, and are 
worse the more money was raised in the fund’s vintage year.  Finally, Jones and Rhodes-Kropf 
(2004, table 2) employ Venture Economics data between 1980 and 1999 and report that venture 
capital funds have a beta of 1.11, load negatively on the HML factor, but do not load on the SMB 
factor.  Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2004) also predict and find that because of the sequential 
nature of the contracting negotiations between entrepreneurs and venture investors, venture 
capital returns will be correlated with total risk, not just systematic risk. 
 
Other studies have used data at the level of the individual venture capital investment.  
Cochrane (2005) employs the VentureOne database to measure the standard deviation, alpha and 
beta of round-to-round and round-to-IPO returns to venture capital investments after applying an 
approach that aims to correct for the selection bias created by the greater availability of 
valuations for successful firms.  Using VentureXpert data, Sarin et al. (2003) examine a large set 
of private equity financing rounds and find that the probability of exit, the valuation multiple, 
and the expected investment gain from a financing round depend on industry, firm stage-of-life, 
the financing amount, and the prevailing market sentiment. 
 
As in Cochrane (2005), my study focuses on the narrowest measure of venture investment 
return, the round-to-round return earned between successive pre-IPO venture capital financings 
in a given company.  However, I include an extensive set of controls for news about the firm’s 
future cash flows that comes out during the return window.  I also concentrate on one industry, 
the U.S. biotech sector.  This allows me to examine the impact of firm size and book-to-market 
on venture returns within a reasonably homogenous setting, reducing the need to control for 
across-industry differences in production functions, growth options, and risk.  The downside of 
focusing on the biotech sector is that I am less able to generalize the papers’ main results and 
inferences beyond the biotech sector. 
 
4.2. The implications of existing theories for the pricing of firm size and book-to-market for 
round-to-round returns in pre-IPO venture-backed biotech companies 
 
In a seminal series of papers, Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1996) report that firm size and 
book-to-market ratios supplant the CAPM beta in explaining variation in the expected returns to 
U.S. and international publicly traded stocks.  Although much attention has been since been paid 
to understanding the reasons for their findings, there remains much disagreement as to why small 
firms and firms with high book-to-market ratios on average earn high expected returns.  In this 
section I outline the main explanations and develop the predictions that each makes in the new 
setting of venture capital investments in pre-IPO biotech companies. 
 
4.2.1. Dynamic evolution of systematic risk as a consequence of optimal investments 
 
In a recent study, Berk et al. (1999) derive the implications for expected equity returns when 
aggregate firm risk is endogenously determined by a firm’s optimal and dynamic exploitation of 
its growth options.  Berk et al. assume that growth options are homogeneous in their expected 
cash flows, but heterogeneous in their beta risk.  In their model, firms’ assets turn over as some 
assets-in-place expire, new growth options with differing risk characteristics arrive, and firms 
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respond optimally to those new growth options through their actual investment choices.  The 
central feature of Berk et al.’s model is that firms that perform well tend to be those that have 
discovered valuable growth options.  As these are exploited, the firm’s systematic risk and mix 
of growth options to assets-in-place changes in predictable ways. 
 
Berk et al. show that their model simplifies such that firm size and book-to-market become 
sufficient statistics for the aggregate risk of assets-in-place.  That is, the state variables in the 
model can be eliminated, resulting in conditional expected returns being shown to be related to 
economically interpretable firm characteristics—specifically, firm size and book-to-market 
ratios.2  Firm size is negatively related to expected returns because it is a proxy for the state 
variable that describes the importance of the firm’s assets-in-place relative to its growth options.  
The book-to-market ratio is positively related to expected returns because it serves as a proxy for 
the state variable that summarizes the average systematic risk of assets-in-place.3
 
I argue that the Berk et al. model implies that firm size and market-to-book will be priced in 
the round-to-round expected returns of pre-IPO venture-backed biotech firms because biotech 
firms have large and rapidly evolving growth options and share a common technology (insofar as 
the risk profile of their growth options is concerned).  They therefore match well with the type 
and maturity level of firms that Berk et al. argue will have returns that are heavily influenced by 
the dynamic exploitation of investment opportunities.4
 
4.2.2. Financial distress risk 
 
Fama and French (1993) propose that the associations between firm size, book-to-market and 
returns arise because both firm size and book-to-market are proxies for non-diversifiable factor 
risk, specifically the risk that the firm will experience financial distress.  Although this 
interpretation has not received uniform support (Dichev, 1998; Campbell et al., 2005), it is 
widely viewed as a leading explanation.  Applied to the setting of pre-IPO biotech companies, 
the financial distress explanation predicts that pre-IPO biotech firms that are small and/or have 
high book-to-market ratios will earn high returns. 
 
4.2.3. Behaviorally biased investors 
 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) suggest that high book-to-market stocks earn high returns because 
investors in public markets are behaviorally biased.  Their reasoning is that investors incorrectly 
                                                 
2 The state variables in Berk et al.’s model are the average systematic risk of the firm’s assets-in-place, the current 
risk-free rate, and the number of projects the firm is actively invested in. 
 
3 Carlson et al. (2004) derive the same directional predictions regarding the relations between expected returns, firm 
size and firm book-to-market using a different but complementary approach to that of Berk et al.  Whereas Berk et 
al. hold expected cash flows constant but allow heterogeneity in investment risks, Carlson et al. hold project 
discount rates fixed but permit heterogeneity in expected cash flows via the state of product market demand 
conditions relative to invested capital.  Other papers that have built on and complemented Berk et al.’s model 
include Gomes et al. (2003), Zhang (2004), and Anderson and Garcia-Feijóo (2006). 
 
4 Berk et al. note that their model captures the ideas that expected returns depend on the firm’s life cycle, and that the 
returns of mature firms behave differently from those of growth firms (p.1566). 
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extrapolate that the earnings of firms with poor past earnings growth rates (and therefore have 
high book-to-market ratios) will continue rather than regress to the mean.  Lakonishok et al. 
suggest that such investors overreact by overselling those firms’ stocks, making them 
underpriced and increasing the expected returns available to rational investors whose buying 
pressure subsequently moves stock prices back to the values implied by economic fundamentals. 
 
Pre-IPO biotech firms are primarily financed by venture capital funds.  As with mutual funds 
and hedge funds, venture funds have substantial resources at their disposal with which to hire the 
best and the brightest managers.  I propose that this means that the general partners in venture 
funds will be sophisticated and experienced businesspeople that are not subject to behavioral 
biases.  This proposition therefore predicts that there will be no relation between expected returns 
and book-to-market ratios in venture-backed pre-IPO firms. 
 
4.2.4. Data snooping 
 
Lo and MacKinlay (1990) and Black (1993) argue that repeated analysis on the same publicly 
traded stock return data means that ‘anomalous’ findings such as the pricing of firm size and 
book-to-market merely reflect in-sample data mining and/or misplaced reliance on classical 
statistics.  The advantage offered by the setting examined in this paper is that the prior literature 
on the relations between firm size, book-to-market and returns in the pre-IPO market consists of 
only one study of one fund’s private equity portfolio (Gompers and Lerner, 1998).  As a result, 
the data snooping explanation for why firm size and book-to-market help explain variation in 
expected returns predicts that firm size and book-to-market will not be related to the expected 
returns of pre-IPO venture backed biotech companies because almost no snooping has occurred. 
 




The model of round-to-round venture capital returns that I use to evaluate the competing 
predictions laid out in Section 4 is derived from a log-linear specification of firms’ underlying 
pre-money equity value.  A firm’s pre-money equity value at a given round of funding is the 
value of the firm’s common plus preferred equity before the injection of new capital in that 
round.  Also known as hedonic modeling, the log-linear approach to equity valuation is standard 
in entrepreneurial finance (Lerner, 1994; Gompers and Lerner; 1999, 2000a, b; Seppä, 2003; 
Hand, 2005).  The method proposes that firm value is a log-linear function of plausible proxies 
for the dividends, free cash flows or net incomes that firms may generate far ahead into their 
futures.  It is used instead of more exact valuation methods such as discounted cash flows, free 
cash flows or residual income because not only do pre-IPO venture-backed firms never pay 
dividends, but the vast majority of the equity value of venture-backed firms is attributable to their 
growth options rather than assets-in-place.  As such, summary accounting measures of ex-post 
performance such as net income are typically uninformative about equity value. 
 
5.2. Valuation framework 
 
The valuation framework underlying the model of realized round-to-round returns that I 
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empirically estimate is illustrated as follows.  Consider a three-period world.  At point in time 
t=0 the firm is founded with an initial capital investment.  The terminal payoff to that investment, 
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where E1{X} is the expected value of X conditional on information at t=1 and RETjk is one plus 
the stochastic rate of return between t=j and t=k.  Following the method of hedonic modeling, I 
assume that E{X} is a Cobb-Douglas function of multiple proxies for X, denoted by Y and Z: 
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where Y1 denotes the value of Y at t=1.  Substituting equation (2) into equation (1) and taking 
natural logarithms yields: 
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If no additional investment is made in the firm at t=1, and if new information arriving between 
t=1 and t=2 does not change the expectation of RET23 so that E1{RET23} = E2{RET23}, then the 

































PREMVRET γβ  (4) 
 
Equation (4) says that the log realized return between t=1 and t=2 equals the log expected return 
between t=1 and t=2, adjusted for news about the level of the terminal payoff.  Finally, if the 
expected return is assumed to be a linear function of firm size (FSIZE) and book-to-market 
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where e is the error term that is assumed to capture the difference between and }]{Eln[ 121 RET
11 lnln BTMFSIZE φπδ ++ .  Equation (5) forms the theoretical basis for my empirical tests. 
 
5.3. Empirical specification 
 
                                                 
5 The assumption that new information arriving between t=1 and t=2 does not change the expectation of RET23 such 
that E1{RET23} = E2{RET23} is undeniably a strong one.  In the empirical tests, I aim to control for the mean effects 
of departures from this assumption via indicator variables that reflect when the Series number of round k differs 
from the Series number of round k-1. 
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The round-to-round returns model that I estimate fleshes out equation (5) in several ways.  
First, I replace raw returns with excess returns by subtracting from raw returns the risk-free 
return over the return horizon.  Second, consistent with Fama and French (1992) and Berk et al. 
(1999), I employ the firm’s pre-money value at the beginning of the return window as my 
measure of firm size.  Third, I use total assets at the beginning of the return window rather than 
book equity in computing the book-to-market ratio.  The reason is that book equity is negative in 
46% of my sample observations, primarily due to accounting rules requiring that R&D and other 
intangible costs be expensed rather than amortized over time into income.  Accounting rules 
therefore greatly downward bias the shareholder equity of firms such as young biotech 
companies whose expenses consist almost entirely of investments in intangibles.  Fama and 
French (1992, table III) report that they obtain very similar inferences in the public equity market 
if book-to-market ratios are computed using total assets instead of book equity.  
 
Fourth, I use a broad variety of different proxies for the firm’s future cash flow payoffs.  
They include sector-wide data, denoted BIO (e.g., the level of the AMEX biotech sector index); 
firm-specific financial statement data, denoted FS (e.g., cash, revenues, R&D spending); firm-
specific non-financial statement data, denoted NFS (e.g., patent filings and strategic alliances); 
investor-specific indicator variables, denoted INVIND (e.g., the type of lead investor in a given 
financing round); and indicators for the Series number of the financing round, denoted SERIND 
(e.g., Series A, Series B, etc.).  Full details on these variables are provided in Section 6. Financial 
statement variables are in $000s prior to being log-transformed, and variables that can take a 
value of zero are rescaled by adding +1 to the variable for each observation in the sample (e.g., 
zero revenue is rescaled to $1,000, and $39,000 of revenue is rescaled to $40,000).  
 
Fifth, I generalize equation (5) by taking into account the investment that venture investors 
make at the round that marks the beginning of the round-to-round return window.  To see this, 
note that PREMV is the product of the number of pre-money shares outstanding, SHSPRE, and 
the pre-money price per share, PRICE.  Thus the log change in pre-money valuation between 
adjacent financing rounds k–1 and k, denoted ∆lnPREMVik, is the sum of the round-to-round log 
return ln[RETik] ≡ ln(PRICEik/PRICEi,k-1) and the round-to-round log change in pre-money shares 
outstanding ΔlnPREMSHSik ≡ ln(SHSPREik/SHSPREi,k-1).  With this in mind, I generalize 
equation (5) by including ΔlnPREMSHSik as an additional explanatory variable, although without 
constraining its coefficient to equal –1. 
 
Last but by no means least, I include Heckman’s (1979) inverse Mills ratio, denoted MILLS, 
in the pre-money valuation equation as a first-pass control for the endogeneity biases that may 
arise from restricting the sample to only the most successful venture capital investments—viz., 
those that filed to go public.  This leads to the inclusion of ΔMILLS in the round-to-round returns 
model.  In section 8.4 of the paper I explore a non-Heckman approach to assessing the potentially 
distortive inferential impacts of sample selection biases.  
 
In total, these adjustments lead to the following empirically testable version of equation (5): 
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where i denotes firm i and EXRETik is the excess return between financing rounds k–1 and k.  
Because the round-to-round return from the last round of venture funding is earned at the IPO, 
equation (6) covers both round-to-round returns earned purely within the venture capital market, 




The data used in this study is a synthesis of pre-money equity valuations in the venture 
capital market and at the IPO filing date, characteristics of venture investors, firm-specific annual 
financial statement data, and firm-specific non-financial statement information (Hand, 2005).  
These variables are collected for 203 U.S. biotech companies over the period 1992–2001.  The 
core of the dataset is a merging of the historical annual financial statement data reported in 
biotech firms’ IPO filings with the time-series of those same firms’ pre-money venture capital 
and at-IPO equity values.  On a firm-by-firm basis, each year’s financial statements are matched 
where possible with the first—and only the first—pre-money valuation following the fiscal year-
end, providing that the valuation date was less than a year after the fiscal year-end.  No set of 
annual financial statements was matched with more than one pre-money valuation.  This process 
yielded 481 pairs of pre-money venture capital valuations and 103 pre-money at-IPO valuations 
for which there were financial statements from the preceding fiscal year, covering a total of 203 
firms.  To be usable, a firm’s cash balance, SG&A expense, and R&D expense had to be 
positive.6  The dataset contains 381 pre- plus at-IPO round-to-round returns spanning 182 firms. 
 
I now turn to describe the data and variables used in equation (6).  A description of the model 
used to estimate MILLS, the Heckman inverse Mills ratio, is deferred until Section 7. 
 
6.1. Equity valuation data 
 
Pre-money equity valuations were purchased from Recombinant Capital (Recap), a West 
Coast consulting firm that specializes in collecting and selling information on biotech companies 
(www.Recap.com).  Recap has gathered a full set of the round-by-round financings of over 600 
biotech companies, beginning in the early 1980s. Recap’s equity valuation histories are mainly 
compiled from IPO S-1 and 424B filing documents and the SEC filings of companies that 
acquired biotech firms.  The valuation histories are based on primary preferred and common 
share issuances from the date of founding through the IPO filing.  Preferred shares are converted 
into common equity at the ratios specified in the financing agreements.  The vast majority of 
financings undertaken by venture capitalists are in the form of preferred stock. 
                                                 
6 Although some biotech firms report zero revenues, biotech firms that have no cash, or no SG&A, or no spending 




Relative to other sources of pre-money values such as VentureOne and VentureXpert, one of 
Recap’s distinctive features is that for each financing round it reports the price per share, PRICE, 
the number of pre-money shares outstanding, SHSPRE, and the number of shares issued in the 
financing, SHSISS.  As a result, round-to-round returns can be computed directly, rather than 
having to be inferred from pre-money valuations at round k relative to post-money valuations at 
round k–1.  The log return of firm i between venture capital funding rounds k–1 and k is lnRETik 
≡ ln(PRICEik/PRICEi,k-1), and the excess log return lnEXRET is ln[RET – Rf], where Rf is one plus 
the risk free rate over the return interval. 
 
6.2. Sector-wide data 
 
I use the AMEX Biotechnology Index as a proxy for the prospects of firms in the biotech 
sector.  Lerner (1994) shows that the level of publicly traded biotech stocks is strongly positively 
related to the pre-money values of venture-backed biotech firms. 
 
6.3. Financial statement data 
 
For those firms in Recap’s database that filed to go public, pre- and at-IPO financial 
statement data were collected from S-1 and 424B documents when available online at 
www.sec.gov.  Firms that file to go public have to provide five years’ worth of audited (albeit 
somewhat coarse) historical financial statement data.  
 
The financial statement items whose log changes are included in equation (6) consist of the 
key components of young biotech firms’ balance sheets and income statements—namely cash, 
noncash assets, long-term debt, revenues, and R&D expense.7  Long-term debt includes 
capitalized lease obligations.  Revenue is the sum of collaborative, contract, grant, license, 
research, and product revenues.  The economic nature of these items predicts that the level 
(growth rate) of all but long-term debt will be positively related to firms’ pre-money values 
(round-to-round returns).  Since it is a liability, the level (growth rate) of long-term debt should 
be negatively related to firms’ pre-money values (round-to-round returns).  In addition to these 
items that accounting rules explicitly require firms to record in financial statements, I also 
include the unrecorded or off-balance sheet amount of stock option dilution in the set of financial 
statement items.  Stock option dilution is defined as the number of shares under option divided 
by the number of shares outstanding.  Stock option data are sometimes missing because firms are 
only required to provide three years of pre-IPO-filing stock option data in their S-1 or 424B 
filings.  To account for this, an indicator variable is included in the regressions, set equal to one 
if stock option data are missing and zero otherwise.  After the indicator variable was computed, 
missing stock option dilution observations were reset to zero.  The economic nature of stock 
option dilution predicts that the level (growth rate) of stock option dilution will be negatively 
related to firms’ pre-money values (round-to-round returns). 
 
6.4. Non-financial statement information 
                                                 
7 Cost of sales is excluded because it is only non-zero when the biotech firm has product revenues, which is rare.  




Prior research into pre-IPO biotech firms has found that the number and scope of the patents 
filed by the firm, and the number of its strategic alliances with pharmaceutical companies or 
other biotech firms are associated with venture capital pre-money valuations.  Patents are a key 
mechanism by which young biotech firms create legally defensible property rights on their 
intellectual innovations and property.  As such, they have been seen as biotech companies’ most 
valuable assets.  Lerner (1994) finds that pre-money values are higher the more patents a firm 
has filed or has been granted and the more focused is the scope of the firm’s patent portfolio.  
The number of patents filed with the U.S. Patent Office as of the pre-money valuation date was 
collected online from www.uspto.gov.  Following Lerner (1994), patent scope is defined as the 
cumulative number of distinct four-digit International Patent Classification classes into which a 
firm’s filed patents are assigned, divided by the number of patents that it had filed for. 
 
Alliances with pharmaceutical companies and other biotech companies provide credible 
endorsements of the quality of a biotech firm’s scientific pipeline and management.  They also 
create value for the firm by taking advantage of the particular business and technical expertise 
held by the alliance partners (Lerner and Merges, 1998).  Nicholson et al. (2005) report that 
biotech companies that sign strategic alliance deals with other biotech or pharmaceutical 
companies receive higher pre-money valuations.  Data on the number of strategic alliances come 
from Recap’s alliance database. 
 
Separate from these firm-specific items of non-financial statement information whose 
correlations with pre-money values have been explored by prior work, I examine the effect of 
firm-specific demand on round-to-round venture capital returns.  In a perfect market, the demand 
for any single firm’s equity is perfectly elastic because there is a perfect substitute available and 
there are no market frictions.  However, Gompers and Lerner (2000b) show that this is not the 
case in the illiquid and incomplete venture capital market.  They find that the pre-money 
valuations of venture-backed firms are reliably increasing in the aggregate inflows of capital into 
venture funds.  I extend Gompers and Lerner’s work in this regard by using a firm-specific proxy 
for equity demand in place of the aggregate inflow of capital into venture funds.  The proxy is 
the dilution created by the current financing round, defined as the ratio of the number of shares 
issued in the current round divided by the number of pre-money shares outstanding.  If demand 
for a firm’s equity is less than perfectly elastic, then there will be a negative relation between 
dilution (growth in dilution) and firms’ pre-money values (round-to-round returns). 
 
6.5. Investor-specific characteristics 
 
Gompers and Lerner (1999) find that corporate investors assign higher pre-money valuations 
to firms than do private equity funds, either because corporations perceive there to be strategic 
synergies available, or because corporations engage in less monitoring and business development 
than do private equity funds and therefore require a lower expected return on their investment.  
For each financing round, Recap identifies whether or not the lead investor is a corporation.  
Based on this, I create two indicator variables.  The first is set to one if round k is led by a 
corporate investor, and the second is set to one if round k–1 is led by a corporate investor.  Based 
Gompers and Lerner’s findings, I expect to observe that in a round-to-round returns regression 
the coefficient on the former will be positive while the coefficient on the latter will be negative. 
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I also create a new investor-specific indicator that is set to one if the name of the lead venture 
investor in round k is the same as that in round k–1 (regardless of whether the lead investor is a 
corporation or a venture capital fund).  The coefficient on this indicator is predicted to be 
positive because a strong performance by the firm between rounds k and k–1 would seem likely 
to result in round k–1’s lead investor exploiting the preemptive rights and anti-dilution 
protections granted to him in round k–1 and taking the lead investor position again in round k.8
 
6.6. Financing round Series indicators 
 
The set of Series indicators, SERIND, consists of seven dummy variables covering financing 
rounds Series A through Series ≥ F, plus the IPO itself.  For example, if round k is a Series B 
round, then SERINDB = 1, else SERINDB = 0.  In equation (6), ΔSERIND are more accurately 
described as step-up indicators that take the value one if round k is of a higher level than round 
k–1.  For example, if round k is a Series C round but round k–1 is a Series B round, then 
ΔSERINDC = 1.  It is not automatic that ΔSERINDC = 1 because a firm may have two sequential 
rounds of Series B funding (usually denoted Series B-1 and B-2).  Unlike other databases, Recap 
codes the Series of the financing round—whether the round is Series A, Series B, etc.—rather 
than the life-stage of the firm (e.g., startup, product development, shipping, profitable, etc.). 
 
7. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the sample.  Venture capital financings occur over the 
period 1992–2001, while IPO dates occur over the shorter interval 1995–2001 (panel A).  Most 
biotech firms file to go public four to six years after they were founded (panel B).  The IPO filing 
date for the median firm occurs during preclinical testing or phase I trials, although a few firms 
take much longer to file to go public.  Most sample companies are in pharmaceutical preparations 
(SIC 2834) or commercial, physical and biological research (SIC 8731).  Despite this 
concentration, sample firms comprise a total of 22 different 4-digit SIC codes.  Of firms, 47% 
had their headquarters in California at the time of the IPO filing and 14% were in Massachusetts.  
Headquarter clustering arises because California and Massachusetts have many top universities 
with star scientists on their faculties (Zucker et al., 1998). 
 
Table 2 provides a more detailed description of venture-backed firms, in which the median 
values of key variables are listed on a round-by-round basis from left to right in the typical 
sequence followed by a venture-backed firm, beginning with the Series A funding round and 
ending with the IPO filing.  The number of observations at a given round differs from the number 
of firms in the sample because some sample firms filed to go public after their Series B round but 
others not until after their Series H round.  Also, each set of annual financial statements is only 
ever matched to one financing round.  Table 2 excludes financings not explicitly coded by Recap 
                                                 
8 Admati and Pfleiderer’s (1994) fixed-fraction contract theory supports this prediction in that it explains why the 
granting of pre-emptive rights and anti-dilution protections are optimal with respect to resolving various agency 
problems that arise in a multistage financial contracting situation of the kind encountered by venture investors. 
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as being Series A, Series B, etc.9
 
Pre-money valuations increase as firms mature within the venture capital market at a 
decreasing rate but then double at the IPO (Table 2).  Round-to-round returns typically decline as 
firms mature, although the mean return between the round prior to the IPO and the IPO is a very 
large 159%.  The median values of all financial statement items increase as firms mature, except 
core income which decreases because biotech firms have small revenues but large expenditures 
on SG&A and R&D.  Book-to-market ratios remain low during the time that firms are private 
venture-backed entities.  Of the 584 observations, only 1% have a book-to-market ratio greater 
than one.  Consistent with firms’ growth opportunities being converted into assets-in-place as 
firms mature, the median ratio of assets-in-place to pre-money equity value increases from 0.10 
at Series A rounds to 0.20 at Series F rounds, although the median ratio drops at the IPO to 0.15. 
 
Average firm age tends to rise as the funding Series increases.  The median gap between the 
date on which the pre-money valuation is established and the end of the preceding fiscal year is 
always four months or less, and is smallest for Series A and largest for the IPO.  The proximity 
in time of the financial statements to the valuation date mitigates the potential concerns that 
financial statement data are stale by the time the firm’s current round of financing is undertaken 
and are staler the earlier the round.  Equity dilution created at the current financing round 
declines from a high of 46% in Series A rounds to 17% in Series ≥ F rounds, while the 
probability that the lead investor is a corporation steadily increases.  The median number of 




8.1. Heckman correction for potential selection bias 
 
A key concern in estimating equation (6) is that conditioning on firms that filed for an IPO 
will lead to biased coefficient estimates.  For example, restricting the set of all round-to-round 
returns to only those for which the most successful investment outcome was ultimately 
achieved—that is, an IPO—may well induce a negative loading on the firm size factor in the 
round-to-round returns model.  I therefore include in the regressions an estimate of Heckman’s 
(1979) inverse Mills ratio, denoted MILLS, with the goal of controlling for coefficient distortions 
that may be created by this kind of selection bias.  Using VentureOne data on venture funding 
undertaken by U.S. biotech companies over the period 1985–2002, I estimate MILLS from the 
following Probit selection equation: 
 













                      
lnln
 
                                                 
9 Such financings include investments of common equity, private placements, and debt-related financing such as 
bridge and convertible notes.  These can occur anywhere in the firm’s pre-IPO life, whereas a given firm’s Series C 
financing always follows after its Series B financing, etc. 
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where IPOINDik = 1 if firm i had filed to go public as of 12/31/02, zero otherwise; SERINDa are 
the same Series indicators as in equation (6); lnRAISEDk is the log of the amount of capital raised 
in round k (in $000s prior to being log-transformed); lnBIOPUB is the log of the AMEX 
Biotechnology index at the financing date; CORPINDk = 1 if the lead investor in round k was a 
corporation; and CALIFIND and MASSIND are indicators set to one if the firm had a California 
or Massachusetts headquarters, respectively.  Equation (7) contains no other firm-specific data of 
the kind included in the pre-money valuation or round-to-round returns models because the data 
obtained from VentureOne did not identify firms by name, only by a code number. 
 
The inverse Mills ratio is computed as )(/)( XbXbMILLS ′Φ′= φ , where (.)φ  and  are 
the normal probability density and the normal cumulative density functions, respectively, and b 
and X are the vector of estimated coefficients and the matrix of independent variables in equation 
(7), respectively.  In equation (7), I expect the coefficients on Series indicators to be larger the 
higher is the funding series round (reflecting the higher likelihood of filing for an IPO as the firm 
matures) and that Ω1 > 0 (with more funding rationally reflecting more confidence by venture 
capitalists of the ultimate success of the firm).  I also predict that Ω3 > 0, Ω4 > 0, and Ω5 > 0 
based on the findings of Gompers and Lerner (2000a, Table 5.4).  For a similar type of model 
estimated on all venture-backed firms in VentureOne’s database between 1983 and 1994, 
Gompers and Lerner find that firms are more likely to go public if the financing round is led by a 
corporate investor, and if the firm is headquartered in California or Massachusetts.  Finally, there 
are conflicting predictions for Ω2.  If higher market-wide valuations reflect rational expectations 
of the prospects for the biotech industry, then higher market-wide valuations should imply a 
higher probability that a firm will file to go public.  However, if higher levels of market-wide 
valuations reflect overvaluation of the sector, then the reverse will apply, assuming that the 
overvaluation dissipates over time. 
(.)Φ
 
The results of estimating equation (7) are reported in Table 3.  As expected, the amount of 
funding is positively related to the firm eventually filing to go public.  However, having a 
corporate lead investor or a firm headquartered in California does not increase the probability 
that the firm will file to go public, and being headquartered in Massachusetts is reliably 
negatively—not positively—associated with the probability of filing to go public.  The 
coefficient estimates on the logs of the AMEX biotech index is reliably negative, suggesting that 
higher levels of market-wide valuations are indicative of over-valuation of the biotech sector. 
 
8.2. Pre-money value regressions 
 
Before proceeding to the round-by-round returns regressions that are the focus of this paper, 
Table 4 reports the results of estimating a log-linear model of firms’ pre-money equity values.  
Although the regression estimated in Table 4 differs from the one proposed in equation (3)—by 
virtue of omitting terms for expected returns—it does provide a connection to the literature in 
entrepreneurial finance that has estimated the same general types of log-linear models. 
 
Given the atypical features of the IPO round suggested by Table 2’s descriptive statistics and 
the potential concern that the IPO round lies somewhere between a fully private and a fully 
public equity market, I estimate two regressions: one for all pre-IPO and at-IPO rounds 
combined together, and as a robustness test, one for only pre-IPO rounds.  The pooled time-series 
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cross-sectional nature of the data means that regression errors may not be homoscedastic or 
serially independent.  I therefore estimate all regressions using Newey and West’s (1987) 
covariance matrix and Hansen’s (1982) GMM approach.  The GMM approach accommodates 
serial dependence and conditional heteroscedasticity in the residuals and has a small loss of 
precision relative to OLS, should errors in fact be homoscedastic and serially uncorrelated.  
Inferences are unaffected if OLS standard errors are used.  Although Series indicators are in the 
regressions, for parsimony I do not report those coefficients or the intercept in Table 4. 
 
The results in Table 4 generally match well with expectations and prior research.  I discuss 
only the all-rounds results, as the results for just the pre-IPO funding rounds are similar.  In the 
all-rounds sample, 10 of the 15 coefficients have signs that are reliably in the predicted direction.  
The coefficient on the AMEX public market biotech index is reliably positive as predicted.  With 
the exception of revenues, the coefficients on the firm-specific financial statement data are all 
significant in the predicted directions.  The coefficients on firm-specific non-financial statement 
information are more mixed.  On the one hand, firms’ pre-money equity values are reliably 
decreasing in the degree of new equity dilution created at the financing round and reliably 
increasing in the number of the firm’s strategic alliances.  On the other hand, the coefficient on 
the number of patents a firm has filed is insignificant, and the coefficient on the scope of patents 
filed is significantly negative, opposite sign to what was predicted.10  The inverse Mills ratio is 
reliably negative as expected.  While results are strongest and most consistent for pre-IPO 
rounds, not dissimilar results obtain for the smaller at-IPO sample. 
 
8.3. Round-to-round returns regressions 
 
The results of estimating the round-to-round returns model proposed in equation (6) are 
reported in Table 5.  As in Table 4, I estimate two regressions: one for all pre-IPO and at-IPO 
rounds combined together, and as a robustness test, one for just pre-IPO rounds.  In both 
regressions, round-to-round excess returns are reliably negatively related to firm size and 
positively related to firm book-to-market ratios.  In the all-rounds model, the estimated 
coefficient on firm size is –0.16 (GMM Z-statistic = –6.1) while that on book-to-market is 0.12 
(GMM Z-statistic = 3.6).  The size of these coefficients implies that at the means of the 
independent variables, a one standard deviation increase in log firm size leads to a decrease in 
the average round-to-round return of 20%, while a one standard deviation increase in log book-
to-market increases the average round-to-round return by 18%. 
 
The reliably negative pricing of firm size and positive pricing of book-to-market strongly 
conform to the predictions made by Berk et al.’s (1999) theory in which the endogenous relations 
between growth options, optimal investment actions and expected returns lead to firm size and 
book-to-market are sufficient statistics for the aggregate risk of a firm’s assets-in-place.  
Following the reasoning presented in section 4.2, they are less consistent with the predictions 
made by Lakonishok et al.’s (1994) behaviorally biased investors explanation for why firm size 
                                                 
10 Lerner (1994) finds a reliably negative valuation coefficient on the scope of patents filed.  It may be that the 
economics of patent protection may have changed over time such that it is now more valuable to hold a portfolio of 
narrowly scoped patents, rather than broadly scoped ones. Lerner’s sample (1973–1992) and mine (1992–2001) do 
not overlap in time, making this at least possible. 
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and book-to-market are priced in the cross-section of expected returns, and the data snooping 
explanation proposed by Black (1993) and Lo (1994). 
 
Insofar as Fama and French’s (1993) explanation is concerned, the signs on firm size and 
book-to-market are consistent with their theory that firm size and book-to-market are proxies for 
financial distress risk.  However, as shown in Table 2, pre-IPO biotech firms have very low, not 
high, book-to-market ratios.  The median book-to-market ratio in my sample is only 0.17, far 
lower than the median value of 1.26 for all publicly traded firms over the sample period.11  Such 
low levels of book-to-market ratios appear inconsistent with the proposition that book-to-market 
are a proxy for the risk of financial distress.  In this sense, the pricing of round-to-round returns 
for pre-IPO biotech firms is partly, but not fully consistent with Fama and French’s explanation. 
 
Beyond the pricing of firm size and book-to-market, Table 5 reveals that the realized round-
to-round excess returns to pre-IPO venture-backed companies are sensitive to a wide variety of 
news.  First, round-to-round excess returns are positively related to the excess returns of publicly 
traded biotech firms.  For example, in the pre-IPO + at-IPO regression, the estimated beta of 0.85 
on the AMEX biotech index lies between the beta of 0.3 reported by Cochrane (2005, table 4) on 
the S&P500 index, and the beta of 1.45 reported by Cumming and Walz (2004, table 4) on the 
Morgan Stanley Capital International index. 
 
Second, returns are positively related to news about three firm-specific financial statement 
items (firms’ cash balances, noncash assets, and R&D expenditures) and are negatively related to 
news concerning two firm-specific non-financial statement variables (the dilution created at 
financing dates and the round-to-round growth in shares).  Round-to-round returns are also 
related to news about two investor-characteristics: returns are reliably higher if the lead investor 
in the current financing round is a firm rather than a venture fund, but, contrary to expectations, 
returns are lower if the lead investor in the current round is the same as in the previous round. 
 
8.4. Robustness tests 
 
The most important robustness issue is whether the estimated inverse Mills ratio in Tables 4 
and 5 successfully controls for selection biases.  To the extent that it is not, inferences made in 
section 8.3—particularly those dealing with the pricing of firm size and book-to-market ratios—
may be wrong.  I therefore try to measure the effects of selection bias in different ways. 
 
8.4.1. Omitting the inverse Mills ratio 
 
In unreported tests, I estimated the regressions reported in Tables 4 and 5 after omitting the 
inverse Mills ratio computed from Table 3.  No major inferences changed.  In particular, the 
pricing of firm size (book-to-market) in returns in Table 5 remains reliably negative (positive). 
 
8.4.2. A non-Heckman approach to evaluating the effects of selection bias 
 
The ideal biotech dataset would be one that contained all the independent variables used in 
Table 5 for all the round-to-round returns for all venture-backed biotech firms regardless of their 
                                                 
11 As noted in Section 5.3, the book measure that I employ is total assets, not shareholder equity. 
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ultimate status.  This would yield no selection biases on regression coefficients.  Unfortunately, 
this database does not exist because firms are far less likely to disclose or “make visible” their 
firms’ valuations at financing rounds that occur at what they believe are low prices, and financial 
statement data is only systematically available and visible for firms that file to go public. 
 
Along the valuation dimension, the closest thing to the abovementioned ideal biotech dataset 
is Sand Hill Econometrics’ health sector catalog of firm valuations and financings.  This 
meticulously constructed dataset is the deepest and most comprehensive set of valuations for 
U.S. venture-backed companies available to date.  The version used in this study contains pre-
IPO firms’ valuation histories including the valuation at the ultimate exit of the company, if there 
was one, as of May 2004.  Sand Hill codes exit events as falling into one of four exhaustive 
categories: the firm went public; the firm was acquired; the firm went out of business, or the firm 
is still in business as a private company. 
 
I exploit the likely minimal presence of exit-based selection biases in Sand Hill’s database by 
estimating on it a restricted version of Table 5’s round-to-round returns model.  Relative to the 
model estimated in Table 5, the model estimated and reported in Table 6 includes only three 
independent variables—firm (pre-money) size, the return on the AMEX biotech index, and the 
growth in new equity dilution created at the beginning and end of return window financing 
rounds.  The Table 6 model is therefore restricted relative to the Table 5 model.  First, the Sand 
Hill database does not contain firms’ book values, so a book-to-market variable cannot be 
constructed.  Second, of the firm- and investor-specific variables in Table 5’s regressions, only 
new equity dilution is in or can be computed from the Sand Hill database.  Third, the Sand Hill 
database contains only visible round-to-round returns—that is, returns computed from 
consecutive rounds for which both a post-money value is available or ‘visible’ at round k–1 and a 
pre-money value is visible at round k.  Finally, for simplicity I use raw rather than excess returns. 
 
Panel A of Table 6 summarizes the ultimate status of the firms in Sand Hill’s database for 
which at least one visible round-to-round return and all three of the required independent 
variables were available.  Of the 1,669 round-to-round returns, 44.7% were associated with firms 
that as of May 2004 had gone public, 13.9% were associated with firms that were acquired, 5.7% 
were associated with firms that had gone out of business, and 35.7% were associated with firms 
that were still private and in business.  Since firms can go out of business without losing 100% of 
equity value, I ascribe a uniform return of –90% to all round-to-round returns that were coded as 
ending at the round where the firm went out of business. 
 
Panel B of Table 6 reports two sets of regression results.  The first are for the Sand Hill 
database, while the second are from estimating the same regression plus the round-to-round 
change in the Inverse Mills ratio on the all-rounds data used in Table 5.  The results for the Sand 
Hill database are consistent with the proposition that in the absence of conditioning on the 
ultimate status of the firm, firm size is reliably negatively priced in (visible) round-to-round 
returns.  Also, as in Table 5, the public market beta is reliably positive and the coefficient on the 
growth in new equity dilution is reliably negative.  The results for the all-rounds data used in 
Table 5 are very similar.  This indicates that although the model estimated in Table 6 is a highly 
restricted version of the model estimated in Table 5, it is not so restricted as to yield different 
inferences on the independent variables that are common to both models. 
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The results in Table 6 therefore suggest that the negative pricing of firm size found in Table 5 
is not due to the coefficient on firm size being biased because the sample used in Table 5 
conditions on only firms that were successful enough to file to go public.  I therefore cautiously 
conclude while it cannot be ruled out that the results on the pricing of firm size, firm book-to-
market and news-related variables found in Table 5 are a spurious result of selection biases, the 
Heckman controls included in Table 5 together with the test results reported in Table 6 seem to 
indicate that selection biases may not be a major source of inferential risk. 
 
8.4.   Other robustness tests 
 
Beyond the selection bias issues just addressed, the results reported in Tables 4 and 5 are 
robust to a variety of perturbations.  For example, similar results obtain if firm size is measured 
using total assets or a firm’s post-money value at round k–1, or if the log of the ratio of long-term 
debt to equity value is added to control for the “missing” portion of book equity that is excluded 
by defining book-to-market ratios using total assets rather than shareholder equity.  No 
differences in inference arise if the regressions include indicator variables for the main four-digit 
SIC codes 2834, 2836 and 8731, or indicators for firm headquarters’ location in California or 
Massachusetts.  Taking into account the varying lengths of the return windows by including the 
length of the return window as an additional explanatory variable has immaterial effects on the 
estimated regression.  Inferences also remain unchanged if rank regressions are estimated. 
 
8.5. Caveats and limitations 
 
Beyond the uncertainty as to the generalizability of results derived from only biotech firms, it 
may be that my inferences are biased due to correlated omitted variables.  Although this study 
has gone to some length to include variables found by prior work to be relevant to the values and 
returns of venture-backed firms, there may still be factors omitted that are materially correlated 




In this paper I proposed that pre-IPO venture-backed biotech companies offer a productive 
new setting through which to shed light on competing theories of why firm size and book-to-
market explain variation in expected stock returns.  This is because pre-IPO biotech firms have 
very large and rapidly evolving growth options relative to assets-in-place.  Such attributes align 
closely with the key features of Berk et al.’s (1999) theory of the endogenous relations between 
growth options, optimal investment actions and expected equity returns, where firm size and 
book-to-market emerge as sufficient statistics for the aggregate risk of a firm’s assets-in-place. 
 
Using venture capital investments in pre-IPO U.S. biotech companies during 1992-2001, I 
found that equity returns between financing rounds are reliably negatively related to firm size 
and positively related to book-to-market ratios.  After undertaking both Heckman and non-
Heckman approaches to evaluating the potential inferential distortions arising from selection 
biases (in that I am only able to use firms that were the most successful, those that went public), I 
concluded that my results are probably not due to selection bias.  Instead, I conclude that the 
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negative pricing of firm size and the positive pricing of book-to-market are most consistent with 
Berk et al.’s theory as well as being somewhat inconsistent with the alternative explanations of 
financial distress, behaviorally biased investors, and data snooping.  I also found that realized 
returns are affected by a wide variety of sector-wide, firm-specific and investor-specific news.  
Taken together, the results of this paper suggest that notwithstanding the unusual features of the 
venture capital market, venture capital investors sensibly incorporate a great deal of relevant 
information into firms’ equity prices when they invest new capital.  This would seem to bode 
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Descriptive statistics on sample of U.S. biotech companies, 1992–2001 
  
 
The venture capital market sample is the subset of U.S. firms in Recombinant Capital’s (Recap) 
pre-IPO biotech valuation database that met two criteria: the firm’s IPO filing document was at 
www.sec.gov; and the pre-money valuation date was less than 12 months after a pre-IPO-filing 
fiscal year-end and was the first financing event after that fiscal year-end.  The valuation date is 
the date the terms of the financing round were agreed on by the firm and the venture investors.  
The at-IPO sample is the set of Recap firms that had an IPO filing document online (whether 




Panel A:  Distribution of valuation dates 
Sample 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Venture market 15 29 46 60 77 70 67 60 52 5  
At-IPO 0 0 0 1 30 18 11 6 33 4  
 
Panel B:  Number of years between the firm’s founding and its IPO filing 
 # years # firms # years # firms  
 0 to 1 year 0 7 to 8 years 14 
 1 to 2 years 4 8 to 9 years 14 
 2 to 3 years 12 9 to 10 years 6 
 3 to 4 years 23 10 to 11 years 5 
 4 to 5 years 41 11 to 12 years 6 
 5 to 6 years 42 12 to 13 years 2 
 6 to 7 years 22 13 to 15 years 2    
 
Panel C:  Distribution of firms’ 4-digit SICs 
  4-digit SIC SIC industry description # firms % firms 
  2834 Pharmaceutical preparations 61 32% 
  8731 Commercial, physical and biological research 49 25% 
  2836 Biological products (except diagnostic substances) 20 11% 
  3845 Electromedical and electrotherapeutic apparatus 12 6% 
  2835 In vitro and in vivo diagnostic substances 11 6% 
  All others Various (representing 17 four-digit SICs) 40 20%  
 
Panel D:  Firm’s headquarter location at the time of its IPO filing 
   State # firms % firms     
  California 90 47% 
  Massachusetts 27 14% 
  Pennsylvania 11 6% 




Medians of key variables at venture capital funding rounds for U.S. biotech companies, 1992–2001 
 
The pre-IPO sample is the subset of U.S. firms in Recombinant Capital’s (Recap) biotech valuation database for which the firm’s IPO 
filing document was at www.sec.gov; and the pre-money valuation date was less than 12 months after a pre-IPO-filing fiscal year-end 
and was the first financing event after that fiscal year-end.  The valuation date is the date the terms of the financing round were agreed 
on by the firm and the venture investors.  The at-IPO sample is the set of Recap firms that had an IPO filing document online. 
 
  
   Venture capital market funding round:     At the IPO  
   Series A Series B Series C Series D Series E Series ≥F filing  
Valuation data ($ mil) 
 Pre-money firm equity value $   6.3 15 27 41 53 55 110  
 Round-to-round raw return (median) n.app. 38% 58% 41% 30% 2% 84%  
 Round-to-round raw return (mean) n.app. 124% 92% 53% 37% 24% 159%  
Financial statement data (preceding fiscal year; $ mil) 
 Cash $   0.2 1.5 2.6 3.6 5.6 9.3 12  
 Noncash assets  $   0.4 0.7 1.2 1.9 2.6 2.5 3.7  
 Long-term debt  $      0 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.6  
 Shareholder equity $ –0.2 1.3 2.3 3.1 5.7 7.8 11  
 Revenue $ 0.03 0 0.05 0.2 1.2 1.9 3.6  
 Selling, general and administration costs $   0.6 0.8 1.3 1.7 2.1 2.4 2.9  
 Research and development expense $   0.9 1.3 2.6 4.5 5.5 6.0 6.9  
 Net income $ –1.0 –1.8 –3.5 –5.4 –6.7 –6.9 –6.7  
 Money raised at financing round $   5.6 6.0 9.2 8.6 9.8 11 40  
 Stock option dilution (%) 6.9% 6.6% 7.2% 11% 11% 12% 11%  
 Total assets ÷ pre-money equity value 0.10 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.15  
Non-financial statement information 
 Firm age at valuation date (yrs.) 2.6 2.5 3.2 4.0 4.8 6.9 5.9  
 Prior fiscal year-end to valuation date (yrs.) 0.18 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.26 0.34 0.46  
 Equity dilution created at financing date 46% 28% 28% 19% 18% 17% 26%   
 Number of patents filed 0 1 2 3 6 8 6  
 Scope of patents filed 0 0.67 0.50 0.67 0.60 0.47 0.50  
 Number of strategic alliances 1 2 2 2 4 4 5  
 Percent of rounds led by corporate investor 8% 12% 14% 20% 24% 24% 0%  




Probit model of the determinants of whether a given round of pre-IPO venture financing 




















The sample is 905 financing rounds in VentureOne’s database that were undertaken by U.S. 
biotechnology companies between 1985 and 2002.  IPOINDik, is set to one if, after financing 
round k, firm i went public by 12/31/02, and zero otherwise.  The mean of IPOIND is 0.47.  
Money raised in financing round k is in $000s prior to being log-transformed. All financial 




  Predicted  
  Coefficient Estimated 
 Independent Variables Sign Coefficient Pr. > χ2  
 Intercept  3.71 < 0.001 
 Indicator: Series A round  –0.35 0.24 
 Indicator: Series B round  –0.21 0.49 
 Indicator: Series C round  0.04 0.90 
 Indicator: Series D round  0.25 0.44 
 Indicator: Series E round  0.27 0.43 
 Indicator: Series ≥ F round  0.29 0.41  
 ln (Money raised in financing round k) + 0.28 < 0.001 
 ln (AMEX public market biotech index) ? –1.16 < 0.001 
 Indicator: Corporate lead investor + 0.21 0.24 
 Indicator: Firm headquartered in California + –0.07 0.52 
 Indicator: Firm headquartered in Massachusetts + –0.28 0.02  
 Log likelihood = –485  (p-value < 0.001) 






Log-linear regressions of pre-money equity values at funding rounds on explanatory variables 
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The pre-IPO sample is the subset of U.S. firms in Recombinant Capital’s (Recap) biotech valuation 
database that met two criteria: the firm’s IPO filing document was at www.sec.gov; and the pre-money 
valuation date was less than 12 months after a pre-IPO-filing fiscal year-end and was the first financing 
event after that fiscal year-end.  The valuation date is the date the terms of the financing round were 
agreed on by the firm and the venture investors.  The at-IPO sample is the set of Recap firms that had 
an IPO filing document online.  The prefix “ln” denotes the natural log transformation.  All financial 
statement data are in $000s prior to being log-transformed.  The dependent variable is lnPREMVik, the 
log of firm i’s pre-money equity value at financing round k.  GMM asymptotic Z-statistics are in 
parentheses.  In each regression, an intercept and Series indicators are estimated but not reported.  
Single, double and triple asterisks denote coefficient estimates that are reliably of the predicted sign at 
the 5%, 2.5% and 1% significance levels, respectively, under a one-tailed test. 
  
   Pre-IPO + at-IPO Only pre-IPO 
 Predicted  funding rounds funding rounds  
Independent variables coef. sign   Coef. Z-stat. Coef. Z-stat.  
Sector-wide factors (BIO) 
  ln(AMEX public biotech index) + 1.74 (15.1)***  1.62 (13.2)*** 
Firm-specific financial statement data (FS) 
  ln(1 + cash) + 0.07 (3.8)*** 0.08 (3.7)*** 
  ln(1 + noncash assets) + 0.12 (6.2)*** 0.13 (5.6)*** 
  ln(1 + long–term debt) – –0.03 (–3.6)*** –0.03 (–3.3)** 
  ln(1 + revenues) + –0.00 (–0.4) –0.00 (–0.1) 
  ln(1 + R&D expense) + 0.14 (4.6)*** 0.15 (4.3)*** 
  ln(1 + stock option dilution) – –1.14 (–3.7)*** –1.44 (–4.2)*** 
  Indicator: No stock option data – –0.24 (–3.8)*** –0.27 (–4.2)*** 
Firm-specific non-financial statement data (NFS) 
  ln(1 + new equity dilution) – –1.94 (–18.5)*** –1.88 (–17.6)*** 
  ln(1 + number of patents filed) + 0.02 (1.2) 0.03 (1.3) 
  ln(1 + scope of patents filed) + –0.12 (–2.2) –0.15 (–2.5) 
  ln(1 + number of strategic alliances) + 0.07 (2.8)*** 0.08 (2.8)*** 
Investor-specific attributes (INVIND) 
  Indicator: Corporate lead investor + –0.10 (–1.6)  –0.09 (–1.4) 
Control for IPO selection bias (MILLS) 
  Inverse Mills ratio – –2.03 (–11.5)*** –1.88 (–10.2)***  
# observations [# firms] 584 [203] 481 [193] 
Series indicators (SERIND) included A to IPO rounds A to F rounds 
OLS regression adj. R2 87% 83% 
Residual standard deviation 0.45 0.47  
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Table 5 
Determinants of the round-to-round returns to venture capital investments for firms 
























The pre-IPO sample is the subset of U.S. firms in Recap’s biotech valuation database that met two criteria: the 
firm’s IPO filing document was at www.sec.gov; and the pre-money valuation date was less than 12 months 
after a pre-IPO-filing fiscal year-end and was the first financing event after that fiscal year-end.  The at-IPO 
sample is Recap firms that had an IPO filing online.  “ln” denotes the log transformation.  EXRET is one plus the 
round-to-round excess equity return.  Financial statement data are in $000s prior to being log-transformed.  Rf is 
one plus the risk-free rate over the return window. GMM asymptotic Z-statistics are in parentheses.  Single, 
double and triple asterisks denote coefficient estimates that are reliably of the predicted sign at the 5%, 2.5% and 
1% significance levels, respectively, under a one-tailed test.  In each regression, an intercept and step-up in 
Series indicators are estimated but not reported. 
 
  
   Pre-IPO + at-IPO Only pre-IPO 
 Predicted  funding rounds funding rounds  
Independent variables coef. sign   Coef. Z-stat. Coef. Z-stat.  
Risk factors (SIZE, BTM) 
 ln(Firm size) – –0.16 (–6.1)*** –0.12 (–4.0)*** 
 ln(1 + firm book-to-market ratio) + 0.12 (3.6)*** 0.15 (3.8)*** 
Sector-wide news (ΔEXMKT) 
 ∆ln(AMEX biotech index) – Ln(Rf) + 0.85 (7.3)*** 0.67 (4.8)*** 
Firm-specific financial statement news (ΔFS) 
 ∆ln(1 + cash) + 0.09 (4.7)*** 0.09 (4.1)*** 
 ∆ln(1 + noncash assets) + 0.06 (2.1)** 0.07 (2.5)*** 
 ∆ln(1 + long–term debt) – –0.01 (–1.2) –0.01 (–1.3) 
 ∆ln(1 + revenues) + 0.01 (0.8) 0.02 (1.7)* 
 ∆ln(1 + R&D expense) + 0.15 (3.9)*** 0.12 (3.1)*** 
 ∆ln(1 + stock option dilution) – –0.24 (–0.5) 0.21 (0.4) 
 Indicator: No stock option data – 0.05 (0.9)  –0.03 (–0.6) 
Firm-specific non-financial statement news (ΔNFS) 
 ∆ln(1 + new equity dilution) – –0.85 (–7.6)*** –0.81 (–5.0)*** 
 ∆ln(1 + number of patents filed) + –0.04 (–0.9) –0.04 (–1.0) 
 ∆ln(1 + scope of patents filed) + –0.03 (–0.6) –0.00 (–0.0) 
 ∆ln(1 + number of strategic alliances) + –0.03 (–0.6) –0.06 (–0.7) 
Investor-specific attributes news (ΔINVIND) 
 Indicator: Corporate lead investor, round k + 0.14 (1.9)* 0.13 (1.7)* 
 Indicator: Corporate lead investor, round k–1 – –0.08 (–1.4) –0.15 (–2.8)*** 
 Indicator: Same lead investor, rounds k and k–1 + –0.09 (–1.9) –0.12 (–2.3) 
Controls (ΔPREMSHS, ΔMILLS) 
 ∆ln(Pre-money shares outstanding) – –0.84 (–6.5)*** –0.82 (–4.9) *** 
 ∆Inverse Mills ratio – –0.65 (–4.7)*** –0.62 (–3.6) ***  
# observations [# firms] 381 [182] 288 [154] 
Step-up in Series indicators (ΔSERIND) included B to IPO rounds  B to F rounds 
OLS regression adj. R2 47% 40% 
Residual standard deviation 0.41 0.39 
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Table 6 
Comparison of the pricing determinants of the visible round-to-round returns to venture 
capital investments for U.S. biotech companies in the Sand Hill Econometrics database, 
without conditioning on the ultimate status of the firm (1992–2001) 
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The sample consists of all companies in the Healthcare sector of Sand Hill Econometrics’ 
financing and valuation database, regardless of the ultimate status of the firm (i.e., firm went 
public, was acquired, went out of business, or is still a private and in business).  Visible round-
to-round returns (RET) are defined as returns for which both the beginning of round and end of 
round company valuations are present in the Sand Hill database; that is, Sand Hill must have a 
non-missing post-money valuation for round k–1 and a non-missing pre-money valuation for 
round k.  The return at an out of business round is set at –90%.  Firm size is the firm’s pre-money 
value at round k–1.  New equity dilution is the equity dilution created by round k’s equity 
investment, defined as the money the firm raised in round k divided by the firm’s pre-money 
value at round k.  New equity dilution is set to zero for acquisition and out of business rounds.  
The prefix “ln” denotes the natural log transformation. GMM asymptotic Z-statistics are in 
parentheses.  A triple asterisk denotes that the coefficient estimate has the predicted sign at the 




Panel A:  Distribution of round-to-round returns in the Sand Hill health sector database 
 Ultimate status of firm Fraction of sample  
 Went public 44.7% 
 Acquired 13.9% 
 Went out of business 5.7% 
 Still private & in business 35.7%  
 
Panel B:  Regression results 
  Database used in regression:  
  Sand Hill Table 5, all rounds 
  Predicted Coef. Coef. 
 Hypothesized determinants coef. sign (t-stat.) (t-stat.)  
 
 ln(Firm size) – –0.07 –0.07 
   (–5.6)*** (–3.1)*** 
 ∆ln(AMEX biotech index) + 0.38 0.55 
   (2.8)*** (8.4)*** 
 ∆ln(1 + new equity dilution) – –0.15 –0.42 
   (–2.6)***  (–3.5)***  
 ∆Inverse Mills ratio –  –0.51 
     (–4.1)***  
 # observations [# firms] 1,669 [800] 381 [182] 
 Adj. R2 5% 25% 
 Residual standard deviation 0.85 0.49  
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